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 A multiplicity of anthropogenic stressors are individually and collectively 
making natural resources management a realm of pervasive uncertainty.1 New and 
                                                                                                                                              
* James I. Farr Presidential Endowed Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College 
of Law, Salt Lake City, UT. I would like to thank Professor Kirsten Engel and the student editorial 
members of the Arizona Journal of Environmental Law & Policy for their invitation to participate 
in “The ‘End’ of Environmental Law? A Multi-Disciplinary Conference,” held at the University of 
Arizona College of Law on January 18, 2019. I would also like to thank Professor Nicola Wheen, 
University of Otago Faculty of Law, for first inspiring me to think about what became the contents 
of this essay. This research was made possible, in part, through generous support from the Albert 
and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence. The author may be reached at 
robin.craig@law.utah.edu. 
1 See Brian C. Chaffin, Hannah Gosnell, & Barbara A. Cosens, A decade of adaptive governance 
scholarship: Synthesis and future directions, 19 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY art. 56, at 1 (2014), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06824-190356 (“Anthropogenic global warming and accelerated 
rates of biodiversity loss are just two of numerous indicators that social and ecological systems do 
not and cannot exist in isolation, but instead exist as a complex whole, each a function of the other 
and expressed in a series of complex feedbacks . . . .”); Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, & Paul C. 
Stern, The struggle to govern the commons, 302 SCIENCE 1907, 1907,  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1091015 (“In the absence of effective governance institutions at 
the appropriate scale, natural resources and the environment are in peril from increasing human 
population, consumption, and deployment of advanced technologies for resource use, all of which 
have reached unprecedented levels.”). 
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legacy pollution—particularly the global spread of plastics2 and persistent organic 
pollutants3 and the tremendous level of nutrient loading4—threaten both human 
and non-human health as well as larger social-ecological function. Loss of 
biodiversity has become egregious enough to be dubbed the Sixth Mass 
Extinction,5 while the impacts of climate change are driving the plethora of 
species that remain to shift their ranges and intermix in ways that have never 
occurred before.6 More pervasively, climate change7 and its “evil twin,” ocean 
acidification,8 are altering the basic conditions of planetary function—from global 
average and local temperatures, to ocean currents, to precipitation patterns, to 
                                                                                                                                              
2 Charles Moore, “Plastic pollution,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
 https://www.britannica.com/science/plastic-pollution (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
3 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS: IMPACT ON 
CHILD HEALTH (2010), 
 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44525/9789241501101_eng.pdf?sequence=1; 
Barry C. Kelly, Michael G. Ikonomou, Joel D. Blair, Anne E. Morin, & Frank A. P. C. Gobas, 
Food Web–Specific Biomagnification of Persistent Organic Pollutants, 317 SCIENCE 236-39 (13 
July 2007). 
4 Will Steffen, Katherine Richardson, Johan Rockström, Sarah E. Cornell, Ingo Fetzer, Elena M. 
Bennett, Reinette Biggs, Stephen R. Carpenter, Wim de Vries, Cynthia A. de Wit, Carl Folke, 
Dieter Gerten, Jens Heinke, Georgina M. Mace, Linn M. Persson, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, 
Belinda Reyers, & Sverker Sörlin, Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a 
changing planet, 347 SCIENCE 736, 736 (13 Feb. 2015) (showing nitrogen and phosphorus 
pollution levels at “high risk” for the entire planet); Guy Woodward, Mark O. Gessner, Paul S. 
Giller, Vladislav Gulis, Sally Hladyz, Antoine Lecerf, Björn Malmqvist, Brendan G. McKie, Scott 
D. Tiegs, Helen Cariss, Mike Dobson, Arturo Elosegi, Verónica Ferreira, Manuel A.S. Graça, 
Tadeusz Fleituch, Jean O. Lacoursière, Marius Nistorescu, Jesús Pozo, Geta Risnoveanu, Markus 
Schindler, Angheluta Vadineanu, Lena B.-M. Vought, & Eric Chauve, Continental-Scale Effects 
of Nutrient Pollution on Stream Ecosystem Functioning, 336 SCIENCE 1438-40 (15 June 2012). 
5 See generally Gerardo Ceballos & Paul R. Ehrlich, The misunderstood sixth mass extinction, 360 
SCIENCE 1080-81 (08 June 2018); Damian Carrington, “Earth’s sixth mass extinction event 
underway, scientists warn,” The Guardian, 10 July 2017, 
 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/10/earths-sixth-mass-extinction-event-
already-underway-scientists-warn; Gerardo Ceballos1, Paul R. Ehrlich, Anthony D. Barnosky, 
Andrés García, Robert M. Pringle, & Todd M. Palmer, Accelerated modern human–induced 
species losses: Entering the sixth mass extinction, 1:5 SCIENCE ADVANCES e1400253, DOI: 
10.1126/sciadv.1400253 (19 June 2015), http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/1/5/e1400253; 
ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL History (Picador: pb reprint ed. 
2015). 
6 I-Ching Chen, Jane K. Hill, Ralf Ohlemüller, David B. Roy, & Chris D. Thomas, Rapid Range 
Shifts of Species Associated with High Levels of Climate Warming, 333 SCIENCE 1024-26 (19 
Aug. 2011); Allison L. Perry, Paula J. Low, Jim R. Ellis, & John D. Reynolds, Climate Change 
and Distribution Shifts in Marine Fishes, 308 SCIENCE 1912-15 (24 June 2005). 
7 James D. Nichols, Mark D. Koneff, Patricia J. Heglund, Melinda G. Knutson, Mark E. Seamans, 
James E. Lyons, John M. Morton, Malcolm T. Jones, G. Scott Boomer, & Byron K. Williams, 
Climate Change, Uncertainty, and Natural Resources Management, 75:1 J. WILDLIFE 
MANAGEMENT 6-19 (2011). 
8 Alexandria B. Boehm, Mark Z. Jacobson, Michael J. O’Donnell , Martha Sutula, W. Waldo 
Wakefield, Stephen B. Weisberg, & Elizabeth Whiteman, Ocean Acidification Science Needs for 
Natural Resource Managers of the North American West Coast, 28:2 OCEANOGRAPHY 170-181 
(2015). 
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water supply, to vegetation patterns, to marine chemistry, and much more.9 At the 
same time, both the global population of humans10 and their consumeristic 
impulses11 continue to increase, leading footprint studies to conclude that we are 
collectively consuming far more than one Earth’s worth of goods and services 
every year.12 
 Unless and until greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
stabilize, we can’t expect to just hunker down and survive until a “new normal” 
emerges. Instead, for a while, everything will be changing all the time—including 
the natural resources upon which all human societies depend. Welcome to the 
Anthropocene. 
 As Melinda Harm Benson and I argued in The End of Sustainability,13 this 
new reality means that managing for "sustainable" use of natural resources will 
become increasingly impossible.14 Trickster law offers a new perspective on 
environmental and natural resources law by combining new scientific models, 
adaptive governance theory, and a new cultural narrative to allow these areas of 
law to better cope with the realities of the Anthropocene. In particular, this essay 
focuses on how, by allowing room for new voices and values, trickster law can 
contribute to the emergence of different priorities and structures of natural 
resource management that promote the resilience of social-ecological systems in a 
changing world. 
 
I. The New Scientific Model: Resilience Theory 
 Resilience theory offers a better paradigm and a different way of thinking 
about natural resource management than the “Balance of Nature” model that was 
in vogue when Congress and many states enacted most of the United States’ 
environmental and natural resource statutes.15 People commonly use “resilience” 
to invoke what theorists call engineering resilience—that is, the ability of a 
person, thing, or system to resist a shock or disturbance in the first place or to 
                                                                                                                                              
9 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: 
CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT 23 (2017); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT SPM 1- SPM 31 (2015). 
10 United Nations Dept. of Economic & Social Affairs, World population projected to reach 9.8 
billion in 2050, and 11.2 billion in 2100, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-population-prospects-2017.html 
(21 June 2017). 
11 WorldWatch Institute, Global Consumption Trends Break New Records, 
http://www.worldwatch.org/global-consumption-trends-break-new-records (last visited Jan. 21, 
2019). 
12 Global Footprint Networks, Earth Overshoot Day: Country Overshoot Days 2018, 
https://www.overshootday.org/newsroom/country-overshoot-days/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
13 MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE END OF SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE 
AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE (Univ. of Kansas 
Press 2017). 
14 Id. at 45-47, 79-134. 
15 Id. at 56-70. 
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bounce back to its former state.16 This definition of “resilience” “focuses on 
efficiency, constancy, and predictability—all attributes at the core of engineers’ 
desires for fail-safe design.”17 Engineering resilience also embodies one of the 
underlying conceptions of nature that currently informs most U.S. natural 
resource law and policy18—an expectation that natural systems have a preferred 
equilibrium balance to which they will return after a shock or disturbance, and 
hence that preservation and restoration are rational legal and policy goals.19 
However, these two goals are becoming increasingly impossible under the 
cumulative and synergistic effects of the stressors that social-ecological systems 
currently face, especially because of climate change.20 
 In contrast, the Stockholm school of resilience theory posits that all social-
ecological systems are constantly changing and that “to ignore or resist this 
change is to increase our vulnerability and forego emerging opportunities.”21 In 
2002, Lance Gunderson and C.S. “Buzz” Holling described a four-phase infinity-
loop cycle of change in ecological systems, which they termed the “adaptive 
cycle”.22 The four phases are rapid growth, conservation, release, and 
reorganization.23 A forest can provide a good example. A young forest proceeds 
through rapid growth to a mature conservation phase, when large trees tie up 
nutrients and limit further growth in the understory. A forest fire triggers the 
release phase, destroying structure and releasing nutrients, and the area will 
reorganize and begin to grow again. All else being equal, the area is likely to 
regenerate a new forest that looks a lot like the last one—but maybe not. 
 The chaos and potential unpredictability of the release and reorganization 
phases of the adaptive cycle are one source of dynamism within resilience theory. 
To add to that dynamism, there are adaptive cycles operating at different temporal 
and geographic scales that interact with each other, a model of system complexity 
that Gunderson and Holling termed “panarchy.”24 Panarchy incorporates a 
systems perspective on natural resources,25 reflecting the fact that ecological and 
social-ecological systems are complex adaptive systems. The panarchical 
                                                                                                                                              
16 C.S. Holling, “Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience,” in NATIONAL ACADEMY 
OF ENGINEERING, ENGINEERING WITHIN ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 31, 33 (The National 
Academies Press 1996), https://www.nap.edu/read/4919/chapter/4#33. 
17 Id. 
18 See id. at 36-37. 
19 BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 13, at 30 
20 Id. at 9-10, 30-32. 
21 BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 9-10 (Island Press 2006); Carl Folke, Stephen Carpenter, Brian Walker, 
M. Sheffer, T. Elmqvist, Lance Gunderson, & C.S. Holling, Regime shifts, resilience and 
biodiversity in ecosystem management, 35 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION, & SYSTEMATICS 
557–581 (2004), http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.35.021103.105711. 
22 WALKER & SALT, supra note 21, at 75-78; LANCE GUNDERSON & C.S. HOLLING, PANARCHY: 
UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 33-35 (Island Press 
2002). 
23 GUNDERSON & HOLLING, supra note 22. 
24 Id. at 72-76. 
25 WALKER & SALT, supra note 21, at 31. 
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interactions of nested adaptive cycles thus reflect the real complexity and 
unpredictability of natural systems, revealing an avoidable element of 
management chaos that current natural resources law and policy need to 
acknowledge and incorporate.26 For law, panarchy means that the same 
management action in a system won’t always generate the same response—
particularly when larger scale systems, like the climate, are themselves 
changing.27 
 Key to this model of perpetual but complex and unpredictable change is 
the concept of ecological resilience. Ecological resilience describes the ability of 
a system to absorb—adapt to—shock and disturbance without crossing an 
ecological threshold and transforming into a different state.28 The disturbed 
system may not be completely identical to the old one, but it has not yet become a 
completely different system. For example, wetlands can sequester toxics to a 
point without dying, but they are no longer pristine, and many ecosystems have 
lost a species or two without significant changes in function. However, at some 
point, disturbance or shock can overwhelm the current system and it will 
transform: Dump too many nutrients into a crystal clear, cold mountain lake and it 
will undergo eutrophication, likely becoming warm, algae-ridden, and species 
poor.29 From a regulatory perspective, human activities in a system can 
effectively lower the thresholds for system transformation, pushing systems 
across those thresholds and transforming them into new states of being.30 
Resilience theory also teaches us that social-ecological systems are not nearly as 
knowable and controllable as U.S. law and policy often assume.31  
 
II.  Adaptive Governance  
 Adaptive governance is an important aspect of effectuating resilience 
theory in law and policy. Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern are 
generally credited with coining the terming “adaptive governance” in 2003 to 
describe this new kind of environmental governance,32 although the concept 
existed earlier.33 Governance “refers to the means . . . through which collective 
goals are chosen, decisions are made, and action is taken to achieve the chosen 
goals,” while “environmental governance” denotes the more specific governance 
mechanisms “related to society’s interactions with natural systems.”34 If resilience 
                                                                                                                                              
26 BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 13, at 61-63. 
27 Id. at 64. 
28 WALKER & SALT, supra note 21, at 62-63; Holling, supra note 16, at 33. 
29 WALKER & SALT, supra note 21, at 55-58. 
30 BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 13, at 58. 
31 Id. at 35, 45-46. 
32 Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, supra note 1, at 1908. 
33 Chaffin, Gosnell, & Cosens, supra note 1, at 3 tbl. 1. 
34 Barbara A. Cosens, Lance Gunderson, & Brian C. Chaffin, Introduction to the Special Feature 
Practicing Panarchy: Assessing legal flexibility, ecological resilience, and adaptive governance in 
regional water systems experiencing rapid environmental change, 23 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY art. 4, 
at 3 (2018), https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09524-230104; see also Chaffin, Gosnell, & Cosens, supra 
note 1, at 1 (“Broadly, environmental governance can be thought of as a ‘set of regulatory 
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theory is a scientific approach to modeling continual change in complex 
ecological and social-ecological systems, then adaptive governance is the legal 
and policy response to that same reality—“environmental governance that allows 
emergence of collective action capable of facilitating adaptation to change and 
surprise as well as the capacity to itself evolve.”35  
 While adaptive governance by definition cannot be mandated,36 societies 
can enhance the chances that adaptive governance will both emerge and take root 
as the new governance system.37 Folke et al.38 provided a fairly comprehensive 
examination of the social dimensions of adaptive governance. They identified as 
key features: (1) “[p]rocesses that generate learning, meaning, knowledge, and 
experience of ecosystem dynamics”;39 (2)  real crises adaptive management; (3) 
“polycentric institutional arrangements, which are nested quasi-autonomous 
decision-making units operating at multiple scales,” including bridging 
organizations and a redundancy of function; (4) social networks with adaptive 
leaders, flexible organizations, and significant trust relationships;40 and (5) social 
memory, “the arena in which captured experience with change and successful 
adaptations, embedded in a deeper level of values, is actualized through 
community debate and decision-making processes into appropriate strategies for 
dealing with ongoing change.”41 These researchers concluded that societies that 
possess these features will possess high adaptive capacity, allowing for both 
adaptability, “the capacity of actors in a social-ecological system to manage 
                                                                                                                                                       
processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence environmental 
actions and outcomes’ . . . . In short, environmental governance is the system of institutions, 
including rules, laws, regulations, policies, and social norms, and organizations involved in 
governing environmental resource use and/or protection, and there are a variety of different 
approaches.” (citations omitted)). 
35 Cosens, Gunderson, & Chaffin, supra note 34, at 3. See also Chaffin, Gosnell, & Cosens, supra 
note 1, at 1 (“Given the uncertainties associated with global environmental change, including 
climate change and massive shifts in land use, environmental governance systems going forward 
must be highly adaptive. Governance systems, particularly those of top-down, state-based 
orientation, rarely match the relevant scale of ecological complexity, especially in the face of rapid 
environmental change . . . .” (citations omitted)), 4-5 (situating adaptive governance within 
resilience theory scholarship), 5 (noting that adaptive governance “is unanimously viewed as a 
system of environmental governance with the potential to mediate the complexity and uncertainty 
inherent in SESs [social-ecological systems] . . . .”). 
36 Chaffin, Gosneel, & Cosens, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing adaptive governance as an emergent 
institution and concluding “that the social components of a SES must beadequately ‘prepared’ 
before transformation can take place”). 
37 Barbara A. Cosens, Robin K. Craig, Shanna Lee Hirsch, Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Melinda 
Harm Benson, Daniel A. DeCaro, Ahjond S. Garmestani, Hannah Gosnell, J.B. Ruhl, & Edella 
Schlager, The role of law in adaptive governance, 22 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY art. 30 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-08731-220130. 
38 Carl Folke, T. Hahn, P. Olsson, & J. Norberg, Adaptive governance of social-ecological 
systems, 30 ANNUAL REV. ENVT. & RESOURCES 441, 445-53 (2005), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.energy.30.050504.144511.   
39 Id. at 445. 
40 Id. at 449. 
41 Id. at 453. 
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resilience in the face of uncertainty and surprise,” and potentially for 
transformability, “the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when 
ecological, economic, or social (including political) conditions make the existing 
system untenable.”42 
 Law, of course, can play a key role in helping to ensure that the necessary 
social and governance conditions exist, or at least can develop, that in turn allow 
adaptive governance to emerge. Cosens et al.43 have offered a set of guidelines for 
assessing whether a particular governance regime is primed for adaptive 
governance.44 First, the structure of law and governance must be polycentric, 
integrative, and persistent.45 Polycentric structures legally allocate authority to 
multiple entities, allowing for redundancy in function, nesting of governance, 
complementary levels of governance and governance foci, and subsidiarity, 
meaning that the level of governance appropriate to the problem addresses that 
problem.46 In terms of capacity, the governance system must have adaptive 
capacity, the authority and willingness to respond to change, and participatory 
capacity—meaning that the relevant stakeholders have both the legal right and 
sufficient resources to participate in decision-making.47 Finally, the governance 
system must have legal processes in place to ensure legitimacy, procedural 
justice, and dispute resolution while at the same time achieving a problem-solving 
approach, the ability to balance stability and flexibility, and the capacity to reflect 
upon and learn from prior decisions.48 This collection of factors ensures that the 
relevant governance system can adapt to a changing social-ecological system 
through methods and decisions that will be viewed as legitimate, inclusive, and 
imposing only the necessary amounts and kinds of social and economic 
disruption—i.e., through “good governance.”49  
 Even then, however, some sort of disturbance or crisis in the system is 
likely to be necessary for adaptive governance to actually emerge; the governance 
version of the release and reorganization phases in the adaptive cycle. Cosens et 
al. explained that:  
 
A disturbance sufficient to trigger the emergence of new approaches to 
governance may come from an ecological or social (political or economic) 
crisis, whereas a governance window of opportunity is thought to occur 
when the appropriate combination of problem, solution, and politics 
intersect to make change possible . . . .50 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
42 Id. at 457. 
43 Cosens et al., supra note 37. 





49 Id. at 3.  
50 Id. 
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III. A New Cultural Narrative: The Trickster 
 Resilience theory and adaptive governance are not enough, alone, for law 
and policy to incorporate continual change and surprise into U.S. natural 
resources law. In addition, we need a new cultural narrative.51 “Luckily, a 
different kind of narrative exists in many cultures that can far more productively 
frame climate change, allow for a more productive attitude toward coping with its 
surprises and transformations: The story of the “trickster”.52 Trickster tales can 
become powerful cultural narratives for dealing with a world of continual change 
“because they place humans in a different relationship to ecological change than 
the dominant US narratives do—humans are neither controlling engineers or 
victims of natural forces but rather components of a complex system who have a 
real but bounded ability to deal with its changes.”53 Specifically, as Thomas and 
Patricia Thornton have noted:  
 
The tenor and rhetoric of the prevailing discussions of climate change and 
the Anthropocene are at odds with an alternative heuristics circulating in 
many indigenous communities that are instead shaped by the shared 
understanding that humans are but a small part of a relational universe that 
cannot be fully cognized, much less managed, by any one species.54 
 
 Tricksters are agents of chaos and change, forces that disrupt normal 
expectations and sometimes violate important cultural or sacred boundaries.55 
Like ecological resilience and particular system states, “the trickster is generally 
neither good nor evil; he is amoral . . . simply a facet of reality, not a moral theory 
or prescription.”56 However, “as humans interact with the trickster and his 
disruptions, they learn to adapt to change to accommodate the new realities that 
the trickster brings, helping to ensure their own survival.”57 
 While trickster stories and trickster figures exist all over the world and in 
most cultures,58 anthropologists tell us that the trickster is notably, pervasively, 
indeed almost insistently absent from one prominent culture: the Euro-American 
culture of the United States.59 This is a critical gap in cultural narratives for the 
Anthropocene because, among other things, trickster tales teach humans to expect 
the unexpected and that change—good or bad—is just a part of life. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                              
51 BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 13, at 46-49. 
52 Id. at 50. 
53 Id.  
54 Thomas E. Thornton & Patricia M. Thornton, The Mutable, the Mythical, and the Managerial: 
Raven Narratives and the Anthropocene, 6:1 ENVIRONMENT & SOCIETY 66, 68 (2015). 
55 “Tricksters,” Myths Encyclopedia, http://www.mythencyclopedia.com/Tr-Wa/Tricksters.html 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
56 BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 13, at 51 (citations omitted). 
57 Id. (citations omitted). 
58 “Tricksters,” Myths Encyclopedia, http://www.mythencyclopedia.com/Tr-Wa/Tricksters.html 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
59 BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 13, at 51 (citation omitted). 
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the trickster narrative connects social experience to scientific modeling, as shown 
through Lance Gunderson and Buzz Holling invoking the Greek trickster god Pan 
to coin their term “panarchy” within resilience theory.60 
IV. An Overview of Trickster Law 
 A natural resources law that thoroughly embraces resilience theory and 
promotes adaptive governance, within cultural narratives that also accept 
change—even surprising change—constitute what this essay refers to as trickster 
law. Operating through what I have elsewhere called “principled flexibility,”61 
trickster law seeks not, as current laws often do, to use natural resources to the 
maximum extent deemed possible and desirable, but rather to preserve and 
enhance the ecological resilience of desirable ecosystem states to climate change 
and ocean acidification. It employs a precautionary approach to human use of 
natural resources and seeks to minimize anthropogenic stressors, such as pollution 
(especially nutrients and toxics), on social-ecological systems. It is cognizant of 
the planet’s limitations and confines human social and economic endeavors within 
the “safe operating space” of a functional planet.62 
 At the same time, consistent with resilience theory, trickster law 
acknowledges that some transformations are and will increasingly become 
unavoidable, especially as a result of global warming and its multi-faceted 
impacts. Trickster law thus encourages anticipation of, and planning for, these 
transformations before they become social-ecological crises. Moreover, it seeks to 
guide these transformations into new but still productive states, avoiding both 
ecological stagnation (like eutrophication of lakes) and social-economic collapse 
as the resource bases of specific communities change. 
 Finally, trickster law creates space for new voices and new values that can 
help societies cope with a changing world. As noted, adaptive governance 
literature stresses the importance of polycentricity and pluralism to the emergence 
of new and more flexible forms of governance. Thus, as a governance system, 
adaptive governance “requires a structure of nested institutions (complex, 
redundant, and layered) and institutional diversity (a mixture of market, state, and 
community organizations) at the local, regional, and state levels, connected by 
formal and informal social networks . . . .”63 Within these social networks, 
moreover, it becomes “essential that a diverse array of vested stakeholders 
eventually participate . . . .”64 In addition, “Those affected [must] have the right 
and resources to have a role in decision-making. For indigenous communities, this 
equates to the capacity for self-determination. Participatory capacity reduces the 
likelihood of marginalization of portions of society and increases the likelihood 
that all aspects of a system will be considered in decision making.”65 
                                                                                                                                              
60 GUNDERSON & HOLLING, supra note 22, at 21. 
61 Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for 
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 63 (2010). 
62 Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
63 Chaffin, Gosnell, & Cosens, supra note 1, at 7. 
64 Id. at 8. 
65 Cosens et al., supra note 37, at 2 tbl. 1. 
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 Allowing new voices and new perspectives into the governance space has 
proven quite helpful in encouraging the emergence of adaptive governance. The 
next section presents three examples. 
 
V. New Voices, New Values, More Flexible Governance and Greater 
Resilience: Three Examples 
A. Preserving Instream Flows in the American West 
 When Europeans began settling the western half of the United States in the 
19th century, they faced the reality of pervasively arid landscapes where rivers, 
streams, and lakes were relatively few and farming generally impossible without 
irrigation. Mining, similarly, required substantial diversions of water away from 
waterways. As a result, all western states except Hawai’i eventually rejected the 
English rules of riparian water use as an adequate basis for their water law and 
water rights, adopting prior appropriation instead. Prior appropriation imposes a 
“first in time, first in right” principle that awards the strongest (most senior) water 
rights to the users who first apply water from a particular source to a recognized 
beneficial use without waste.66 
 Unlike riparianism, common-law prior appropriation accords no value to 
water left in situ. The result is that the majority of streams and rivers in the West 
are over-appropriated and run dry in the summer and early fall, even in the 
absence of drought—to the significant detriment of both aquatic ecosystems and 
non-consumptive uses such as recreational rafting and kayaking.67 
 Enter the tricksters. Beginning with Oregon in 1955, western states began 
to adopt legal mechanisms for protecting instream flow.68 The motivation for 
doing so was in part economic. As the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service recognized in 
1988, “[t]he demand for instream uses of water is rapidly increasing in many 
States . . . as recreation and associated instream uses make significant 
contributions to local, State, and regional economies.”69 Oregon’s early concerns, 
for example, derived from wanting to protect the spectacular waterfalls along the 
Columbia River Gorge,70 which were and remain important and easily accessible 
tourist attractions just east of Portland. 
 However, nontraditional voices in western water law, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)71 and, increasingly, tribes have also been 
critical to the expansion of instream flow protections. While most states continue 
                                                                                                                                              
66 Matthew J. McKinney & Jonathan G. Taylor, National Ecology Research Center, U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service, Instream Flow Information Paper No. 18 (Biological Report 89(2)) 2 (Oct. 
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68 Id. at iv, 3-4. 
69 Id. at 2 (citations omitted). 
70 Id. at 3. 
71 Lynne Marie Paretchan, Choreographing NGO Strategies to Protect Instream Flows, 42 
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 33, 34 (2002) (“NGOs are now a major force working toward the 
restoration and protection of instream flows throughout the West.”). 
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to limit who exactly can hold an instream flow water right, Lynne Marie 
Paretchan has outlined the numerous roles that NGOs can play in helping to 
establish instream flow protections. In Oregon, for example, “[t]he quantity of 
streamflows in rivers is a primary focus for the Center for Environmental Law 
and Policy, Oregon Water Trust, and WaterWatch,”72 while in Idaho, “Idaho 
Rivers United successfully petitioned the Idaho Water Resource Board to 
establish minimum streamflow levels on priority streams.”73 Other NGOs, 
including American Rivers, California Trout, Pacific Coast Federation of 
Fishermen’s Associations, and Trout Unlimited, focus on aquatic ecosystem 
and/or fish protection.74 Trout Unlimited, as one example, has been critically 
important to instream flow protection in Utah and is one of the few entities that 
can statutorily hold instream flow rights in that state.75 “For NGOs focusing on 
ecosystem protection and preservation, their work on instream flow issues is a 
piece of the larger puzzle. NGOs in this category include Environmental Defense, 
Friends of the Earth, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, The Nature Conservancy, 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council.”76 In California, Environmental 
Defense and the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations joined 
forces to monitor the Department of Interior, which has an obligation to deliver 
800,000 acre-feet of water to maintain river flows for salmon and steelhead, and 
discovered that Interior was delivering only half of that obligation.77 They 
eventually sued Interior and won, increasing stream flows for these fish.78 Perhaps 
most creatively, NGOs have established water trusts: 
 
Water trusts operated by NGOs acquire previously allocated water rights 
and transfer them to an instream flow use as allowed by state statute or 
judicial guidelines. In states where only public agencies are allowed to 
hold instream flow rights, NGO water trusts can play a valuable role by 
acting as the broker and/or facilitator for transfers of water rights to state 
agencies to hold for instream flow purposes.79 
 
Such trusts exist in Oregon and Washington.80 
 Tribes can also contribute to instream flow protection, particularly when 
their recognized rights to water extend to fishing rights. Tribal water rights, or 
Winters rights, are a special kind of federally reserved water rights, created under 
federal law whenever Congress or the President reserved land for a tribal 
reservation. These rights are established as a matter of federal law and take as 
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their priority date the date of the reservation. As a result, these tribal reserved 
water rights tend to be very senior. In addition, they also tend to be quite large, 
because they include enough water to make the tribal homeland livable, 
traditionally in the sense of providing enough water to irrigate for farming. In 
addition, many tribes—but especially those in the Pacific Northwest—have 
specific treaty rights related to fisheries that can support additional water rights as 
well as other legal protections.81 
 A fairly dramatic example of tribal water rights that improved instream 
flow is occurring in the Klamath River Basin. This basin straddles the Oregon-
California border. Serious battles over water in this basin began in 2001, when a 
federal judge refused to allow irrigators to take water during a drought in order to 
protect fish in the system listed for protection under the Endangered Species Act. 
The ensuing history of legal battles and coalition forming are both complicated 
and well-studied. The legal and political dynamics changed again in 2013, when 
the Oregon Water Resources Department finished its Klamath River general 
stream adjudication and awarded very large and very senior—some dating to 
“time immemorial”—water rights to the Klamath Tribes.82 These rights “provide 
that specific quantities of water are to be maintained in stream to provide for 
fisheries and other treaty resources.”83 As such, the Klamath Tribes can now 
direct that whatever water remains in the Klamath River during a drought be used 
for fish—and, by extension aquatic ecosystems. This new authority is not just 
theoretical. Within three months of the adjudication decision, the Tribes “called” 
the river, insisting that other users honor their senior rights, and they have done so 
every spring since.84 
                                                                                                                                              
81 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), rehearing en banc denied, 
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 Tribal and NGO efforts to leave water in western streams and rivers 
strengthens the resilience of these waterways and their ecosystems to drought and 
climate change. Thus, once western water law changed to recognize new values 
for water and the interest groups who want to promote those values, progress 
toward a more resilient future increased. 
 
B. Tribal Water Quality Standards 
 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,85 better known since its 1977 
amendments as the Clean Water Act, is the nation’s premier statute for protecting 
streams, rivers, lakes, and oceans from water pollution. However, although the 
statute has included states as important regulators since its first enactment in 
1972, it wasn’t until 1987 that Congress allowed tribes to also engage in water 
quality management. In the amendments that year, Congress added Section 518 to 
the Act, which, among other things, authorized the Administrator of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “to treat an Indian tribe as a State” for 
purposes of administering the Act if the tribe is federally recognized and has 
sufficient governance capacity.86 Such recognition can give the tribe authority to 
set water quality standards within its reservation boundaries and to issue 
permits.87 
 As of early 2019, the EPA has recognized 60 tribes as having authority to 
issue their own water quality standards, but only 44 have actually done so.88 
Importantly, tribal water quality standards not only allow the tribe to extend its 
self-governance within its own reservation, but they give the tribe authority to 
affect upstream activities that can degrade water quality below those standards. 
For example, under Section 401 of the Act, the tribe acquires the right to certify—
or, importantly, object to—any federal license or permit for any activity that 
might result in a discharge into regulated waters within the reservation.89 “No 
license or permit shall be granted until the certification. . .has been obtained or 
has been waived,” and “[n]o license or permit shall be granted if the certification 
has been denied . . . .”90 In addition, the tribe can impose conditions on the federal 
permit to ensure that its water quality requirements are met.91 
 Tribes also receive protection from upstream discharges regulated through 
state-issued Clean Water Act permits. The permitting state must provide notice of 
any new permit to the downstream tribe, and the EPA, and give the tribe an 
opportunity to object or offer recommendations.92 If the state does not incorporate 
                                                                                                                                              
85 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388 (2012). 
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the objections or recommendations, it must again notify both the tribe and the 
EPA,93 and the tribe can appeal to the EPA to object and, if conflict persists, take 
over the particular permit.94 
 Tribal water quality standards often protect values, such as subsistence 
harvest or sacred ceremonial use of waterways, that state water quality programs 
do not, and hence the creation of tribal water quality standards can lead to inter-
sovereign conflict. In one of the first cases centered on tribal water quality 
standards, for example, the downstream Isleta Pueblo set water quality standards 
for its portion of the Rio Grande River that were more stringent than the State of 
New Mexico’s,95 in part because of prevailing drought conditions, but also to 
protect sensitive subpopulations and to ensure water quality good enough for 
primary contact ceremonial use96—that is, “the use of a stream, reach, lake, or 
impoundment for religious or traditional purposes by members of the PUEBLO 
OF ISLETA; such use involves immersion and intentional or incidental ingestion 
of water.”97 
 The upstream City of Albuquerque challenged the EPA’s decision to 
approve the tribe’s standards on several legal grounds. However, its primary 
motivation for the lawsuit was the fact that new, more stringent standards 
downstream led the EPA to revise the permit for Albuquerque’s waste treatment 
facility, requiring the city to better treat its sewage before discharge.98 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the EPA’s approval against all of 
the city’s arguments, including procedural challenges, challenges based on the 
Clean Water Act, and an Establishment Clause challenge to the ceremonial use 
standard.99 
 Five years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
similarly upheld the EPA against the State of Wisconsin’s challenges to water 
quality standards promulgated by the Sokaogon Chippewa Community, also 
known as the Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians.100 The 
reservation’s water resources were critical to the Band’s culture and survival; as 
the court explained, “the Band is heavily reliant on the availability of the water 
resources within the reservation for food, fresh water, medicines, and raw 
materials. In particular, Rice Lake, the largest body of water on the reservation, is 
a prime source of wild rice, which serves as a significant dietary and economic 
resource for the Band.”101 Indeed, the Band considers the waters it depends upon 
to be sacred.102 While Wisconsin raised several objections to the EPA’s granting 
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of Tribes as States (TAS) status to the Band, its true concerns were more 
pragmatic. Specifically, the granting of TAS status and the resulting protection of 
the food and cultural resources of Rice Lake had “the potential to throw a wrench 
into the state’s planned construction of a huge zinc-copper sulfide mine on the 
Wolf River, upstream from Rice Lake” because “the tribal water standards might 
limit the activities of the mine by prohibiting some or all of the discharge from the 
mine . . . .”103 
 The Band not only won the case but also the larger development battle. 
Using revenue from their casinos, the Mole Lake Band and the nearby Forest 
County Potawatomi Community purchased the Crandon Mine in 2003.104 The 
purchase allowed the tribes to protect the area and the Wolf River in nearly its 
natural state, preserving both tourist income and natural resources required for 
cultural practices.105 
 In both of these cases, enactment and enforcement of tribal water quality 
standards most immediately preserved the tribes’ ability to engage in their cultural 
traditions, many of which are sacred. In Wisconsin, they also helped to inspire 
more extensive landscape-scale protection of natural resources. However, these 
more stringent tribal water quality standards have also lessened the pollution 
loads that the Rio Grande and the Wolf River might otherwise have been subject 
to, increasing these systems’ general resilience to other stressors, like climate 
change. In other words, by allowing tribes to participate actively in water quality 
management, Congress has created one form of trickster law. 
 
C. Māori Fisheries 
 The story of how New Zealand came to first legally recognize and then 
legally settle Māori marine fishing rights is long and complicated and largely 
beyond the scope of this essay. However, along the way, increasing Māori 
involvement in coastal fisheries has expanded the mechanisms through which 
New Zealand protects its marine biodiversity, helping the entire nation to comply 
with its obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
 In general, New Zealand law does not allow for nuanced creation of 
marine protected areas (MPAs)—areas that legally protect marine life from at 
least some kinds of threats. For instance, in other nations, some MPAs might 
forbid particularly destructive forms of fishing, such as seabed trawling or blast 
fishing, while others might prohibit offshore oil and gas development. Under New 
Zealand’s Marine Reserves Act of 1971, however, only marine reserves can be 
created—that is, areas where absolutely no fishing and no take of marine 
resources can occur and that exist almost exclusively “for the scientific study of 
marine life . . . .”106 Otherwise, New Zealand’s ocean territory is presumed open 
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to fishing, which New Zealand has regulated through a series of Fisheries Acts. 
The Fisheries Act of 1983, for example, is known world-wide for its adoption of a 
fisheries quota management system, or QMS,107 which New Zealand continues to 
employ.108  
 The Fisheries Act of 1996 recognizes two types of Māori-managed fishing 
areas that began in the late 1980s. The first, a taiapure, or local coastal area, is a 
coastal or estuarine area of particular importance to an iwi (tribe) or hapu (sub-
tribe or large family group) for food or spiritual and cultural reasons.109 The 
declaration of a taiapure110 allows for local Māori management of fisheries and 
substantial input into the local fisheries regulations.111 However, other fishers can 
also use the area, and commercial fishing is often allowed.112 Ten taiapure have 
been established throughout New Zealand.113 Mātaitai, in contrast, allow Māori 
management of customary (non-commercial) fisheries;114 both non-Māori and 
commercial fishing are often excluded. There are 11 mātaitai on the North Island 
and 35 on the South Island.115 
 New Zealand became a party to the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity in September 1993.116 In pursuing its commitments under 
this treaty, New Zealand promulgated a Biodiversity Strategy in 2000 with goals 
to be met by 2020, including goals for marine biodiversity.117 Specifically, in the 
ocean, New Zealand seeks to “[p]rotect a full range of natural marine habitats and 
ecosystems to effectively conserve marine biodiversity, using a range of 
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appropriate mechanisms, including legal protection.”118 One action to meet this 
objective is to “[a]chieve a target of protecting 10 percent of New Zealand’s 
marine environment by 2010 in view of establishing a network of representative 
protected marine areas,” where such MPAs can include “marine reserves, world 
heritage sites, and other coastal and marine management tools such as mataitai 
and taiapure areas, marine area closures, seasonal closures, and area closures to 
certain fishing methods.”119 
 Thus, taiapure and mātaitai have morphed from Māori-led forms of 
fisheries management into MPAs that contribute to national and international 
biodiversity goals. By amending New Zealand’s fishery laws to allow for both 
increased and different Māori fisheries management, the New Zealand Parliament 
also incidentally allowed for non-marine reserve forms of MPAs that provide new 
tools to protect and manage marine species. Biodiversity protection and 
enhancement, of course, also contributes to the resilience of New Zealand’s 
marine ecosystems and the coastal communities that depend upon them. 
VI. Conclusion 
 We need a new form of law—trickster law—to allow natural resources 
management to keep pace with the Anthropocene and its many changes and 
challenges. While trickster law has a number of components, opening natural 
resources management to new actors and new value systems within existing 
governance structures can be a relatively simple way to encourage creativity and 
shifts in perspective that can help bring about more adaptive forms of governance, 
while simultaneously preventing pluralism from descending into management 
chaos. Prior appropriation water law absorbs instream flow and tribal water rights; 
the Clean Water Act absorbs a new set of sovereigns setting water quality 
standards through the Act’s existing tools for conflict management; New Zealand 
fisheries law absorbs new forms of Māori management along the coast while 
maintaining its quota management system elsewhere.  
 These three examples also illustrate how the incorporation of new values 
into natural resource management can also effectively increase the resilience of 
social-ecological systems to climate change and other stressors. Often, as the 
examples presented here suggest, these new management approaches amount to a 
more precautionary approach to human use, particular in terms of reducing or 
preventing pollution and limiting extraction and take. However, the new actors’ 
cultural value systems are also critical to legitimizing this new precaution, 
whether they be recreationally, ecologically, or culturally/spiritually motivated: 
The Mole Lake Band’s priorities are not the same as Wisconsin’s, but the public 
standard-setting process, with review by both the EPA and the federal courts, 
allow those different perspectives to be heard and a peaceful resolution reached, 
including the purchase of a proposed mine to finally end the controversy. 
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